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Abstract		The	 present	 study	 argues	 that	 political	 communication	 on	 social	 media	 is	 mediated	 by	 a	platform’s	digital	architecture	–	the	technical	protocols	that	enable,	constrain,	and	shape	user	behavior	in	a	virtual	space.	A	framework	for	understanding	digital	architectures	is	introduced,	and	 four	 platforms	 (Facebook,	 Twitter,	 Instagram,	 and	 Snapchat)	 are	 compared	 along	 the	typology.	 Using	 the	 2016	 U.S.	 elections	 as	 a	 case,	 interviews	 with	 three	 Republican	 digital	strategists	 are	 complimented	with	 social	media	data	 to	qualify	 the	 study’s	 theoretical	 claim	that	a	platform’s	network	structure,	functionality,	algorithmic	filtering,	and	datafication	model	affect	political	campaign	strategy	on	social	media.	
	The	 structural	 design	 of	 an	 environment	 –	 its	 architecture	 –	 intimately	 affects	 human	behavior.	This	interplay	between	structure	and	agency	is	not	limited	to	physical	environs;	 it	also	 applies	 to	 how	 users	 interact	 with,	 and	 within,	 online	 spaces.	 Scholars	 have	 argued	previously	 that	 a	 digital	 platform’s	 architecture	 can	 influence,	 for	 example:	 the	 norms	 of	interaction	among	users	(Papacharissi,	2009),	the	deliberative	quality	of	their	communication	(Wright	 &	 Street,	 2007),	 or	 their	 likelihood	 to	 enact	 democratic	 ideals	 (Freelon,	 2015).	
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However,	despite	the	rising	interest	in	political	campaigning	on	social	media,	few	studies	have	questioned	 how	 a	 platform’s	 design	 features	 influence	 political	 actors’	 communication	strategies.	This	oversight	is	likely	attributable	to	scholars’	penchant	for	treating	social	media	as	a	 single	media	genre	when	 in	 fact,	 these	platforms	exhibit	 significant	differences	 in	 their	network	 structures,	 functionalities,	 algorithms,	 and	 datafication	models.	 The	 present	 study	compares	 four	 social	 media	 platforms	 (Facebook,	 Twitter,	 Instagram,	 and	 Snapchat)	 along	their	digital	architectures,	with	the	aim	of	providing	a	new	theoretical	framework	for	studying	political	communication	across	social	media	platforms.			The	scholarly	inattention	to	the	design	features	of	social	media	is	problematic	for	two	reasons.	 First,	 political	 actors	 increasingly	 utilize	 social	media	 as	 campaigning	 tools	 during	elections.	 In	 the	United	 States,	 political	 advertising	 on	 digital	media	 across	 local,	 state,	 and	national	elections	rose	from	1.7%	of	ad	spending	in	the	2012	election	cycle	to	a	14.4%	share	in	 2016	 (Borrell,	 2017).	Moreover,	 a	 growing	body	of	 literature	 from	 countries	 outside	 the	U.S.	indicates	that	electoral	campaigning	on	social	media	is	a	truly	global	phenomenon	(Jacobs	&	 Spierings,	 2016;	 Strandberg,	 2013;	 Grant,	Moon,	 &	 Busby	 Grant,	 2010).	 These	 and	 other	case	 studies	 help	 elucidate	 how	 political	 actors	 use	 social	 media	 to	 advance	 their	 political	agenda	 in	 a	 given	 social,	 cultural,	 or	 electoral	 context.	 Taken	 together,	 though,	 they	 lack	 a	unifying	theoretical	framework	for	studying	political	communication	on	different	social	media	platforms.	This	study	provides	such	a	model	through	its	focus	on	digital	architectures.	The	 second	 reason	 scholars’	 inattentiveness	 to	 the	 role	 of	 digital	 architectures	 is	problematic	 concerns	 the	 increasing	 pluralization	 and	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 social	 media	landscape.	Newer	platforms	like	Snapchat	and	Instagram	vie	for	users’	attention	and	encroach	upon	the	market	share	previously	held	by	platforms	like	Facebook	and	Twitter.	In	response,	established	 providers	 either	 aggressively	 cannibalize	 the	 features	 of	market	 challengers	 or,	
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alternatively,	attempt	to	buy	them	out	entirely.	Both	Instagram	and	Facebook’s	incorporation	of	Snapchat-specific	 features,	 such	as	disappearing	messages	and	self-documenting	 ‘stories’,	exemplify	 the	 former	 strategy.	 The	 latter	 strategy,	 meanwhile,	 is	 evidenced	 by	 Facebook’s	acquisition	of	 Instagram	and	WhatsApp,	 as	well	 as	Twitter’s	 successful	bid	 for	Periscope	 (a	live	streaming	service).	The	recent	transformations	in	the	social	media	landscape	encourage	political	 actors	 to	 adopt	 new	 platforms	 and	 features	 to	 reach	 different	 portions	 of	 the	electorate.	 The	 existing	 trend	 among	 scholars	 to	 conduct	 single	 platform	 studies,	 or	 to	subsume	multiple	platforms	under	a	single	“social	media	use”	variable,	is	no	longer	sufficient	to	assess	the	complexity	of	contemporary	“hybrid	political	communication	systems”	(Karlsen	&	Enjolras,	2016).		Aiming	 to	 assist	 future	 cross-platform	 research,	 this	 study	 is	 a	 theoretical	 piece	offering	 a	 new	 heuristic	 for	 approaching	 political	 communication	 on	 social	 media.	 First,	 I	propose	a	 framework	for	conceptualizing	digital	architectures	by	presenting	a	typology	that	consists	of	four	parts:	network	structure,	functionality,	algorithmic	filtering,	and	datafication.	The	 digital	 architectures	 of	 Facebook,	 Twitter,	 Instagram,	 and	 Snapchat	 (according	 to	 how	they	were	 structured	 in	 early	 2016)	 are	 then	 compared	 along	 the	 typology.	 To	 bolster	 the	comparison,	two	data	types	are	incorporated	in	the	study.	The	first	is	qualitative	insights	from	interviews	with	 three	digital	 strategists	working	 for	Republican	candidates	 in	 the	2016	U.S.	election.	 The	 second	 is	 quantitative	 social	 media	 data	 from	 three	 platforms	 (Facebook,	Instagram,	and	Snapchat).	These	empirical	elements	do	not	explicitly	test	the	causal	effect	of	digital	architectures	on	campaign	strategy;	such	an	analysis	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	paper.	Rather,	the	empirical	data	is	intended	to	help	motivate	new	pathways	for	comparative	cross-platform	 research	 that	 can,	 piece-by-piece,	 further	 our	 understanding	 of	 contemporary	political	campaigning.		
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Digital	Architectures	and	Affordances	Whether	 an	 anonymous	 web	 forum	 like	 Reddit	 or	 4Chan,	 a	 natively	 web-based	 social	networking	 site	 like	 Facebook	 or	 Twitter,	 or	 an	 exclusively	 mobile	 app	 like	 Snapchat	 or	WhatsApp,	 social	 media	 providers	 are	 faced	 with	 the	 challenge	 to	 develop	 digital	communication	 tools	 that	 are	 easy	 to	 use	 and	 functional	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 varying	 user	demographics.	At	the	same	time,	these	providers	are	competitors	on	the	market	and	strive	to	develop	different	profiles	that	attract	users,	solicit	advertisers,	and	sustain	economic	viability.	Unsurprisingly,	 then,	 social	 media	 platforms	 display	 significant	 differences	 in	 their	 digital	architectures:	 the	 technical	 protocols	 that	 facilitate,	 constrain,	 and	 shape	 user	 behavior	 in	 a	
virtual	 space.	 In	 line	with	what	 van	 Dijck	 and	 Poell	 (2013,	 pp.	 5-6)	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 logic	 of	“programmability,”	 a	 social	 media’s	 digital	 architecture	 is	 written	 in	 code,	 influenced	 by	algorithms,	 and	 constantly	 tweaked	 by	 developers	 to	 maintain	 a	 competitive	 market	advantage	(see	Lessig,	1999;	Beer,	2009).	Previous	 scholarly	 work	 has	 argued	 effectively	 that	 digital	 communication	technologies	 provide	 structural	 affordances	 to	 agents	 (Papacharissi	 &	 Yuan,	 2011;	 boyd	2011).	However,	the	concept	of	affordances	is	theoretically	vague,	and	its	analytical	utility	is	questionable	(Oliver,	2005;	Parchoma,	2014).	Broadly	understood	as	“possibilities	for	action”	(Evans,	Pearce,	Vitak,	&	Treem,	2017,	p.	36),	affordances	lacks	an	agreed	upon	definition,	and	the	 highly	 inconsistent	 application	 of	 the	 term	 has	 been	 extensively	 critiqued	 elsewhere	(Wright	&	Parchoma,	2011;	Evans	et	al.,	2017).	As	scholars	work	to	refine	the	concept,	there	remains	 a	 need	 to	 “delineate	 how	 affordances	work”	 (Davis	 &	 Chouinard,	 2017,	 p.	 6)	 by	examining	the	underlying	mechanisms	of	a	technology	and	investigating	how	they	shape	user	behavior.	 The	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 the	 architecture	 of	 a	 technology	 underpins	 its	affordances,while	offering	a	more	empirically	observable	object	of	analysis.		
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	Take,	 for	example,	stairs	as	a	technology	(Davis	&	Chouinard,	2017;	McGenere	&	Ho,	2000).	Stairs	afford	climbing,	but	 it	 is	 the	architectural	design	of	stairs	 that	 influences	 their	perceived	and	actual	 “climbability”	 (Warren,	1984).	An	affordance	approach	might	consider	the	extent	to	which	stairs	enable	climbing,	whereas	an	architectural	approach	would	examine	how	climbability	 is	directly	 influenced	by	specific	properties	of	 the	technology:	 the	distance	between	 steps,	 the	angle	of	 the	 rise,	 and	other	aspects	 relating	 to	 the	 structure’s	 form.	The	two	approaches	are	not	necessarily	at	odds,	but	the	architectural	approach	is	arguably	more	conducive	for	comparing	climbability	across	different	types	of	stairs.				Applying	the	affordances	concept	to	social	media,	Kreiss,	Lawrence,	&	McGregor	(2017,	p.	 12,	 original	 emphasis)	 have	 recently	 defined	 affordances	 as	 “what	platforms	 are	actually	
capable	 of	 doing	 and	 perceptions	 of	 what	 they	 enable,	 along	 with	 the	 actual	 practices	 that	
emerge	as	people	interact	with	them.”	One	could	also	argue	that	the	capabilities,	perceptions,	and	practices	relating	to	a	platform	necessarily	derive	from	its	architecture.	While	the	concept	of	 affordances	 refers	 to	what	properties	 of	 communication	 are	 enabled	 by	 a	 platform	 (e.g.,	anonymity,	persistence,	or	visibility	[Evans	et	al,,	2017,	pp.	41-43]),	 the	digital	architectures	heuristic	drills	into	how	a	platform’s	specific	design	features	affect	particular	communication	practices.	 Put	 succinctly,	 digital	 architectures	 shape	 affordances	 and	 consequently,	 user	behavior.		Apart	 from	Kreiss	et	 al.’s	 (2017)	 study,	 the	application	of	 the	affordances	 concept	 to	politicians’	 social	media	use	 is	 rare	 (see	Stier,	Bleier,	Lietz,	&	Strohmaier,	2018	 for	a	 recent	exception	from	Germany).	This	is	most	likely	due	to	the	fact	that	the	large	majority	of	studies	on	 social	 media	 campaigning	 are	 single	 platform	 studies	 (Enli,	 2017;	 Freelon,	 2017;	Filimonov,	Rassman,	&	Svensson,	2016;	Lev-On	&	Haleva-Amir,	2016;	Kreiss,	2016;	Jürgens	&	Jungherr,	2015;	Graham,	Broersma,	Hazelhoff,	&	van’t	Haar,	2013;	Vergeer	&	Hermans,	2013;	
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Larsson	&	Moe,	2012;	Golbeck,	Grimes,	&	Rogers,	2010).	Most	of	the	existing	cross-platform	analyses	 tend	 to	 cast	 their	 empirical	 gaze	 on	 citizens’	 discussion	 networks	 about	 political	issues	(Halpern,	Valenzuela	&	Katz,	2017).	 	This	 latter	strand	of	research	demonstrates	 that	citizens’	online	communication	about	politics	 is	 influenced	by	how	platforms	are	coded	and	designed.	Halpern	and	Gibbs	(2013),	for	example,	show	that	the	anonymity	provided	to	user	accounts	on	YouTube	has	a	negative	impact	on	the	politeness	of	discussion	in	comment	fields	vis-à-vis	 the	 more	 personalized	 accounts	 required	 by	 Facebook.	 Dutceac	 Segesten	 and	Bossetta	 (2017),	 meanwhile,	 find	 that	 in	 the	 social	 media	 discussions	 following	 the	 2014	European	 Parliament	 elections,	 the	 Twitter	 publics	 of	 Sweden	 and	 Denmark	 were	 more	closely	 aligned	 in	 their	 evaluations	 of	 Eurosceptic	 parties	 than	 users	 commenting	 on	 the	Facebook	pages	 of	mainstream	media	 outlets.	 They	 interpret	 their	 findings	 by	 arguing	 that	similar	user	demographics	are	drawn	to	Twitter’s	specific	features	and	news-oriented	content	profile	 (Perrin,	 2015),	 creating	 a	 user	 base	whose	 shared	 attitudes	 toward	 Euroscepticism	override	national	variations	between	the	two	countries.	Both	of	these	studies	suggest	that	the	ingrained	architectural	features	of	a	platform	have	direct	implications	for	the	types	of	political	information	and	communication	that	flow	across	it.			Certainly,	digital	architectures	alone	cannot	 fully	explain	how	or	why	political	actors	campaign	on	social	media;	the	context	of	each	race	is	critical	 in	this	regard	(Auter	and	Fine,	2017;	Aldrich,	2012).	However,	questioning	how	a	platform’s	digital	 architecture	 influences	campaign	 practices	 may	 provide	 insight	 into	 its	 strategy	 and,	 moreover,	 serves	 as	 a	theoretical	 framework	to	 inform	comparative,	cross-platform	research	designs.	Additionally,	the	digital	architectures	heuristic	is	not	limited	to	studies	of	political	campaigning;	it	can	also	be	 applied	 to	 nearly	 any	 facet	 of	 online	 political	 communication:	 political	 debates	 among	citizens,	protest	mobilizations,	or	journalistic	reporting	–	to	name	a	few.			
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In	 the	 following	 sections,	 four	 aspects	 of	 a	 social	 media’s	 digital	 architecture	 are	outlined:	 network	 structure,	 functionality,	 algorithmic	 filtering,	 and	 datafication.	 These	categories	have	been	chosen	since	each	is	argued	to	affect	either	the	political	content	issued	by	politicians	or	citizens’	access	to	political	messages.	Network	structure	influences	how	users	identify	 and	 connect	 with	 political	 accounts.	 Functionality	 governs	 the	 rules	 of	 media	production	 and	 diffusion	 across	 a	 platform.	 Algorithmic	 filtering	 determines	 what	 content	users	 are	 exposed	 to,	 and	 datafication	 provides	 the	 means	 for	 politicians	 to	 target	 voters	outside	 of	 their	 existing	 subscribers.	 These	 categories	 are	 not	 platform-specific	 and	 can	therefore	be	used	 as	bases	 for	 comparing	politicians’	 digital	 strategy	 across	different	 social	media	channels.			
Network	structure	The	 network	 structure	 of	 a	 social	 media	 platform	 refers	 to	 the	 in-built	 criteria	 governing	connections	between	accounts.	Almost	by	definition,	“social”	media	allow	individual	users	to	connect	and	interact	with	peers:	“Friends”	on	Facebook	and	Snapchat,	“Followers”	on	Twitter	and	Instagram,	or	“Connections”	on	LinkedIn.	Additionally,	most	social	media	allow	users	to	establish	connections	with	public	figures,	brands,	or	organizations	(including	political	parties	and	 politicians).	 Such	 high-resource	 actors	 typically	 maintain	 accounts	 with	 a	 different	interface	and	suite	of	 tools	compared	to	the	average	user	(e.g.,	Public	Pages	on	Facebook	or	Business	Profiles	on	Instagram).		Differences	 in	 the	 protocols	 underpinning	 network	 structure	 affect	 three	 aspects	 of	user	 connections.	 The	 first	 is	 searchability,	 which	 refers	 to	 how	 users	 can	 identify	 new	accounts	and	subscribe	to	their	content	(see	boyd,	2011).	The	second	is	connectivity,	referring	here	 to	how	connections	between	accounts	are	 initiated	and	established.	Facebook’s	dyadic	Friend	 structure,	 for	 example,	 requires	 peers	 to	 confirm	 relationships	 and	has	 the	 effect	 of	
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creating	online	networks	that	largely	mirror	a	user’s	offline	relationships	(Ellison,	Steinfield,	&	Lampe,	2007).	Conversely,	Twitter’s	connectivity	is	uni-directional	by	default	and	does	not	require	 a	 user	 to	 confirm	 a	 requested	 connection.	 This	 structural	 feature	 encourages	 one’s	Twitter	network	to	be	by-and-large	composed	of	ties	with	no	real-life	connection	(Huberman,	Romero,	&	Wu,	2009).		The	third	aspect	of	network	structure	is	privacy,	which	pertains	to	the	ability	of	users	to	 influence	 who	 can	 identify	 them	 through	 searches	 (searchability)	 as	 well	 as	 how	connections	 interact	 (connectivity).	 Although	 Snapchat	 tends	 to	 encourage	 a	 more	 private	network	of	close	 ties	 (Piwek	&	 Joinson,	2016)	compared	 to	 Instagram	and	Twitter’s	default	open	privacy	settings,	each	platform	allows	users	to	customize	whether	incoming	connection	requests	 need	 to	 be	 approved	 by	 the	 user.	 Separately	 and	 together,	 the	 three	 elements	 of	network	 structure	 –	 searchability,	 connectivity,	 and	 privacy	 –	 influence:	 the	 network	topography	 formed	 on	 a	 platform,	 the	 strength	 of	 ties	 among	 users,	 and	 subsequently,	 the	type	of	content	 likely	to	be	generated	on	the	platform	(Bossetta,	Dutceac	Segesten,	&	Trenz,	2017).		
Functionality	Functionality	 is	 the	 typology’s	 broadest	 category	 and	 governs	 how	 content	 is	 mediated,	accessed,	and	distributed	across	platforms.	The	first	element	of	functionality	is	the	hardware	from	which	 the	 platform	 is	 accessible:	mobile,	 tablet,	 desktop,	 or	wearable	 accessories	 like	smartwatches	 and	eyewear.	Previous	 research	 suggests	 that	hardware	has	direct	 effects	 on	political	 content.	 Groshek	 and	 Cutino	 (2016),	 for	 example,	 find	 that	 differences	 in	 levels	 of	civility	and	politeness	in	tweets	correlate	to	whether	they	are	issued	from	a	desktop	computer	or	mobile	device.	The	 second	component	of	 functionality	 is	 the	 layout	of	 the	graphical	user	
interface	(GUI):	the	visual	portal	through	which	users	access	and	interact	with	the	platform’s	
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features.	The	GUI	dictates	 the	 look	of	 the	social	medium’s	home	page,	how	a	user	navigates	across	different	spaces	within	the	platform	(e.g.,	 from	a	group	page	to	an	individual	profile),	and	the	available	“social	buttons”	(Halupka,	2014,	p.	162)	that	simplify	processes	of	content	diffusion	across	networks	(e.g.,	Twitter	Retweets	or	Facebook	Shares).		Related	 to	 the	 GUI	 is	 the	 third	 category	 of	 functionality	 –	 the	 broadcast	 feed.	 The	broadcast	feed	aggregates,	ranks,	and	displays	content	on	a	platform	in	a	centralized	manner.	Social	media	vary	in	terms	of	whether	or	not	the	platform	maintains	a	centralized	broadcast	feed	(such	as	the	“News	Feed”	format	popularized	by	Facebook),	what	types	of	accounts	can	contribute	 to	 the	 feed,	 and	how	content	 on	 the	 feed	 is	 accessed	 (i.e.,	 scrolling	down	versus	“click-to-open”).	The	fourth	component	of	functionality	is	supported	media.	This	refers	to	the	multimedia	formats	the	platform	supports	technically	(e.g.,	text,	images,	video,	GIFs),	the	size	and	 length	 constraints	 placed	 on	 acceptable	media	 (text	 character	 limits	 or	 video	 lengths),	and	the	rules	governing	hyperlinking	(both	 in	terms	of	 incorporating	 links	 from	outside	the	platform	 as	 well	 as	 intra-platform	 linking	 via	 hashtags).	 Lastly,	 the	 fifth	 element	 of	functionality	 is	 cross-platform	 integration:	 users’	 ability	 to	 share	 the	 same	 media	 across	several	platforms	simultaneously.		These	 five	 components	 set	 the	 structural	 parameters	 for	 content	 creation	 and	distribution	 across	 a	 network.	 Moreover,	 they	 are	 also	mechanisms	 that	 give	 rise	 to	 user-generated	norms	of	behavior	 influencing	networks	structures	(i.e.,	how	ties	are	maintained)	and	 the	 content	 posted	 by	 users	 (what	 is	 customary	 and	 acceptable	 on	 the	 platform).	 A	platform’s	 functionality	 can	 “dispose	 networked	 publics	 toward	 particular	 behaviors”	(Papacharissi	&	Easton,	2013,	p.	176),	and	Vaterlaus,	Barnett,	Roche,	&	Young	(2016,	p.	599)	have	 found	 that	 transgressing	 the	 “unwritten	 rules”	 of	 Snapchat	 can	 adversely	 impact	interpersonal	 relationships	 among	 youths.	 To	 avoid	 similar	 negative	 effects	 with	 potential	
10	
	
voters,	political	actors	must	be	sensitive	to	the	norms	of	appropriate	content	and	interaction	across	different	social	media	platforms.	If	they	fail	in	their	online	performances	though	social	media,	political	actors	 risk	being	perceived	as	out-of-touch,	 inauthentic,	 and	subsequently	a	less	electable	to	voters.			
Algorithmic	Filtering	Algorithmic	filtering	refers	to	how	developers	prioritize	the	selection,	sequence,	and	visibility	of	posts	(Bucher,	2012).	For	the	typology’s	focus	here	on	political	campaigning,	a	distinction	is	made	between	reach	and	override.	Reach	describes	how	far	a	post	cascades	across	a	broadcast	feed	or	set	of	networks,	and	algorithmic	filtering	can	either	promote	or	limit	a	post’s	reach.	To	drive	revenue,	many	social	providers	allow	users	to	override	algorithmic	filtering	and	further	the	reach	of	a	post	by	offering	pay-to-promote	services,	such	as	“boosting”	on	Facebook.	Both	reach	and	override	are	most	relevant	for	social	media	platforms	with	one-to-many	broadcast	feeds	 (e.g.,	 Facebook,	 Twitter,	 and	 Instagram).	 Other	 social	 media	 maintaining	 a	predominantly	 one-to-one	messaging	 profile	 –	 such	 as	 Snapchat,	WhatsApp,	 Telegram,	 Kik,	and	 Wickr	 –	 are	 less	 influenced	 by	 algorithmic	 filtering	 since	 messages	 are	 sent	 directly	between	 users.	 When,	 though,	 the	 distribution	 and	 visibility	 of	 content	 is	 decided	 by	algorithmic	 ranking,	 the	 coded	 operations	 implemented	 by	 developers	 have	 the	 power	 to	shape	users’	shared	perceptions	of	culture,	news,	and	politics	(Beer,	2009).		
Datafication	Datafication,	 a	 term	 coined	 by	 Mayer-Schönberger	 and	 Cukier	 (2013),	 refers	 to	 the	quantification	 of	 users’	 activities	 on	 a	 social	 media	 platform.	Whenever	 users	 exercise	 the	functionality	of	a	platform,	they	leave	digital	traces	(Jungherr,	2015)	that	can	be	collected	for	a	 variety	 of	 purposes:	 corporate	 advertising,	 market	 research,	 or	 internal	 refinement	 of	 a	platform’s	algorithms	by	developers.	According	to	the	datafication	logic,	maintaining	a	social	
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media	 profile	 during	 campaigns	 has	 less	 to	 do	 with	 establishing	 connectivity	 between	politicians	and	citizens.	Generally,	 levels	of	 interactivity	between	 these	 two	actors	on	social	media	 is	 low	 (Graham,	 Jackson,	&	Broersma,	2014;	 Jackson	&	Lilleker,	 2011).	The	potential	benefit	 for	 campaigns	 to	 take	 up	 social	 media	 electioneering	 is	 that	 they	 can	monitor	 and	harvest	 users’	 digital	 traces	 and	 appropriate	 them	 for	 decisions	 regarding	 persuasion	 or	mobilization	 initiatives	 (Bimber,	2014).	The	2012	Obama	campaign,	 for	example,	effectively	utilized	 data	 from	 Facebook	 through	 an	 application	 that	 encouraged	 supporters	 to	 send	messages	 to	 friends	who	were	 calculated,	 based	 on	multiple	 datapoints,	 to	 be	 persuadable	(Kreiss	&	Welch,	2015).	The	digital	architectures	typology	distinguishes	among	three	elements	of	datafication:	
matching,	targeting,	and	analytics.	Matching	is	the	process	of	identifying	users	in	a	targetable	audience	through	combining	various	forms	of	data.	For	political	campaigns,	digital	strategists	work	in	conjunction	with	polling	firms	to	model	audiences	that	are	predicted	to	be	favorable	to	a	particular	candidate	or	persuadable	along	a	certain	policy	issue.	Data	from	these	models	is	then	merged	with	party-collected	data	(i.e.,	voter	files),	data	collected	by	the	campaign,	and	third-party	data	purchased	from	commercial	data	warehouses	that	sell	personally	identifiable	information	 (such	 as	 information	 from	 credit	 card	 companies).	 This	 data	 is	 used	 to	 build	audiences	 of	 individuals	 who	 are	 first	 matched	 to	 their	 social	 media	 profiles	 and	subsequently,	 targeted	 via	 the	 advertising	 services	 offered	 by	 the	 platform.	 Crucially	 for	campaigns,	analytics	from	these	messages	are	interpreted	in	real	time	in	order	to	“split-test”	messages,	and	campaigns	run	thousands	of	randomized	experiments	to	better	craft	and	hone	their	message	for	persuasive	effect.						
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Data	Collection	and	Method		With	 the	 four	 key	 features	 of	 the	 typology	 introduced,	 the	 digital	 architectures	 of	Facebook,	Twitter,	Instagram,	and	Snapchat	are	systematically	compared	along	each	category	in	 the	 following	 section.	 The	 comparison	 is	 informed	 by	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	data.	The	 former	 is	primarily	composed	of	 interviews	with	 three	 leading	digital	 consultants	from	 four	Republican	 campaigns	 in	 the	 2016	U.S.	 presidential	 election	 (Scott	Walker,	 Rand	Paul,	Marco	Rubio,	 and	Donald	Trump).	Answering	 the	 call	 of	Barnard	and	Kreiss	 (2013,	p.	2057),	 interviews	with	campaign	strategists	were	chosen	to	gain	first-hand	insight	into	how	social	media	–	and	different	platforms	in	particular	–	were	utilized	in	relation	to	the	overall	campaign	apparatus.		The	interview	participants	included	in	the	study	are:	Chasen	Campbell,	Vice	President	of	 Client	 Strategy	 at	 the	 Harris	 Media,	 the	 firm	 heading	 Rand	 Paul’s	 digital	 strategy;	 Eric	Wilson,	Digital	Director	 for	Marco	Rubio’s	 campaign;	 and	Matthew	Oczkowski,	 Chief	Digital	Officer	 for	Scott	Walker’s	campaign	and	Head	of	Product	at	Cambridge	Analytica,	 the	digital	consulting	firm	that	assisted	Donald	Trump’s	general	election	campaign.	The	semi-structured	interviews	were	 conducted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Social	Media	 and	Politics	 Podcast	 and	 are	 openly	accessible	for	download	via	any	podcast	app.		To	help	illustrate	the	statements	of	the	digital	consultants,	social	media	data	from	three	of	the	four	platforms	(Facebook,	Instagram,	and	Snapchat)	is	selectively	presented.	Twitter	data	was	not	collected	during	the	timeframe	studied,	and	limitations	in	Twitter’s	API	rendered	attaining	comparable	datasets	for	each	politician	unfeasible	retroactively.	The	data	that	is	included	was	posted	between	February	22	–	March	15,	2016,	a	timeframe	comprising	one	week	before	and	two	weeks	after	the	string	of	primary	elections	known	as	Super	Tuesday.	This	period	has	been	chosen	to	ensure	a	high	level	of	campaign	activity	on	social	media.	The	
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data	stems	from	five	campaigns’	social	media	profiles:	the	three	highest	polling	Republican	candidates	(Donald	Trump,	Ted	Cruz,	and	Marco	Rubio)	and	top	two	Democrats	(Hillary	Clinton	and	Bernie	Sanders).	Facebook	data	from	the	politicians’	public	pages	was	collected	using	the	rFacebook	package	(Barberá,	Piccirilli,	Geisler,	&	van	Atteveldt,	2017)	for	the	programming	software	R.	Instagram	data,	on	the	contrary,	is	difficult	to	collect	computationally	since	a	user	must	receive	special	permissions	from	Instagram	to	harvest	public	data.	To	meet	this	limitation,	Instagram	data	was	collected	via	accessing	platform’s	web	version	through	the	author’s	personal	account.	Politicians’	Snapchat	“stories”	–	compilations	of	user-generated	messages	that	are	accessible	for	24	hours	–	were	collected	by	utilizing	Android	emulation	and	screen	capturing	software.	First,	BlueStacks	App	Player	was	installed	onto	a	Macintosh	computer,	enabling	the	author	to	access	Android	apps	from	the	computer.	After	downloading	Snapchat,	the	politicians’	accounts	were	identified	and	followed,	with	the	exception	of	Donald	Trump.	As	explained	in	the	paragraphs	below,	newcomers	to	Snapchat	were	difficult	to	identify,	and	for	this	reason	Trump’s	account	is	not	included	in	the	analysis.	However,	another	study	(Al	Nashmi	&	Painter,	2017)	finds	that	over	the	same	time	period,	the	Trump	campaign	rarely	sent	Snapchats.			
Facebook,	Twitter,	Instagram,	and	Snapchat	Compared		
Network	Structure	For	 a	 platform	 to	be	 characterized	 as	 a	 social	medium,	 it	must	 support	 interactions	 among	users.	 As	 argued	 above,	 network	 structure	 -	 the	 criteria	 governing	 connections	 between	accounts	 -	 is	 a	 key	 component	 of	 a	 social	media’s	 digital	 architecture.	 Table	 1	 outlines	 the	network	structure	characteristics	of	the	four	platforms.	 
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 	A	precondition	for	user	interaction	and	network	formation	is	searchability	–	how	accounts	are	identified	and	their	content	accessed.	On	each	of	the	platforms	included	here,	political	actors	maintain	 publicly	 searchable	 profiles	 with	 openly	 accessible	 content.	 However,	 the	searchability	 of	 political	 accounts	 varies	 across	 platforms	 and	 is	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	account’s	username	and	elements	of	 the	graphical	user	 interface.	On	Facebook,	Twitter,	and	Instagram,	the	public	pages	of	politicians	are	typically	 identifiable	by	simply	searching	their	real	names,	and	the	authenticity	of	a	page	is	often	denoted	via	a	blue	verification	checkmark	on	 the	 GUI	 next	 to	 the	 account’s	 username.	 For	 Instagram	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 Twitter,	searchability	can	be	 limited	since	multiple	results	 (including	parody	accounts)	are	returned	after	searching	a	politician’s	name,	and	political	accounts	share	the	same	format	as	that	of	the	average	user.	On	Facebook,	politicians	can	establish	public	pages	that	set	them	apart	visually	(and	 functionally)	 from	 private	 accounts,	 and	 these	 pages	 feature	 prominently	 in	 search	results.	 Political	 accounts	 on	 Snapchat	 have	 the	 lowest	 searchability	 and	 were	 extremely	difficult	to	identify	through	direct	search	in	the	2016	primaries.	To	follow	a	politician,	users	needed	to	know	the	exact	username	of	a	politician’s	account,	which	did	not	follow	a	uniform	pattern	 (e.g.,	 “GovernorOMalley”,	 “CarlyforAmerica”,	 and	 “Christie.2016”).	 The	 platform	 did	
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not	roll	out	a	verification	 feature	until	November	2015,	and	most	politicians	did	not	have	a	verified	account	during	the	time	under	study.		In	 order	 to	 publicize	 their	 Snapchat	 accounts,	 campaigns	 focused	 on	 cross-platform	promotion	 to	 their	 existing	 followers	 on	 other	 platforms.	 Wilson	 stated	 that	 the	 Rubio	campaign	promoted	merchandise	giveaways	on	Facebook	and	Twitter,	where	 the	campaign	already	 had	 a	 strong	 presence.	 To	 be	 eligible,	 users	 were	 required	 to	 document	 that	 they	followed	Rubio	on	Snapchat	by	uploading	screenshots	from	the	platform	to	their	other	social	networks.	 Oczkowski	 mentioned	 that	 Scott	 Walker,	 who	 had	 built	 a	 sizeable	 social	 media	following	 through	 his	 Wisconsin	 recall	 election	 in	 2012,	 promoted	 his	 Snapchat	 account	across	 Facebook,	 Twitter,	 and	 Instagram	 but	 also	 would	 “plug	 it	 at	 events	 and	 rallies	 in	person.”	 While	 campaigns	 tried	 to	 popularize	 their	 lesser-known	 social	 accounts	 on	 other	online	 platforms	 and	 at	 offline	 events,	 these	 messages	 would	 be	 primarily	 visible	 to	 the	campaign’s	already	existing	supporters. The	other	aspects	of	network	structure	-	connectivity	and	privacy	-	are	less	relevant	for	political	campaigning	than	they	would	be	for	analyses	of	individual	user	networks.	On	social	media,	citizens	establish	connections	with	political	accounts	in	a	uni-directional	manner	(that	is,	users	subscribe	to	politicians’	content	without	needing	approval),	since	the	privacy	settings	for	 these	accounts	are	generally	calibrated	to	be	openly	accessible.	Thus,	 the	campaigns	did	not	exhibit	significant	differences	in	practices	of	connectivity	or	privacy	across	platforms.	 As	 argued	 above,	 however,	 connectivity	 and	 privacy	 can	 affect	 the	 norms	 of	communication	 among	 individual	 users.	We	 can	 therefore	 expect	 that	 campaigns	would	 be	cognizant	 of	 these	 norms	 when	 crafting	 their	 communication	 strategy	 across	 different	platforms.	The	low	searchability,	dyadic	connectivity,	and	restrictive	default	privacy	settings	of	 Snapchat	 set	 it	 apart	 from	 more	 open	 platforms	 like	 Facebook,	 Twitter,	 or	 Instagram.	
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Likely,	 these	 features	 affect	 why	 Snapchat	 encourages	 a	 more	 informal	 mode	 of	communication	 among	 close	 ties	 (Bayer	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Oczkowski	 seems	 to	 confirm	 the	informality	 and	 uniqueness	 of	 Snapchat	 communication	 when	 he	 states	 that	 the	 Walker	campaign	used	the	platform	to	“just	give	[followers]	news	and	updates	from	the	road	on	what	we	 were	 doing,	 and	making	 sure	 that	 we	 were	 using	 Snapchat	 appropriately	 and	 not	 just	using	it	with	the	same	exact	content	from	every	other	channel.”	Despite	 the	 different	 type	 of	 communication	 exhibited	 on	 Snapchat,	 the	 barriers	 to	searchability	 limited	 the	 platform’s	 utility	 for	 campaigns.	 Audiences	 were	 small,	 with	Oczkowski	estimating	the	Walker	campaign’s	Snapchat	following	to	be	upwards	of	10,000	and	Wilson	claiming	the	Rubio	channel	to	get	view	rates	of	a	“few	thousand	per	day.”	In	contrast,	politicians	 on	 Twitter,	 Instagram,	 and	 particularly	 Facebook	 have	 a	much	 larger	 user	 base,	incentivizing	 campaigns	 to	 actively	 use	 the	 platform	 to	 reach	 voters.	 Comparing	 the	 view	counts	of	the	same	videos	posted	across	the	platforms	can	give	an	indicator	of	the	audience	sizes	 that	campaigns	reach.	A	30	second	video	posted	by	 the	Rubio	campaign	on	March	5th,	showing	 Rubio	 greeting	 supporters	 before	 a	 speech	 ahead	 of	 the	 Kansas	 caucuses,	 yielded	30,000	 views	 on	 Instagram,	 43,000	 on	 Twitter,	 and	 66,000	 on	 Facebook	 –	 all	 significantly	higher	than	the	Wilson’s	estimation	of	the	viewership	on	Snapchat.	The	number	of	Facebook	video	 views	 registering	 highest	 is	 a	 consistent	 trend	 across	 the	 campaigns.	 For	 example,	 a	video	 issued	 by	 the	 Trump	 campaign	 on	 March	 13th	 –	 a	 13	 second	 video	 of	 Carly	 Fiorina	denouncing	Ted	Cruz	–	garnered	676,000	views	on	Instagram,	778,000	on	Twitter,	and	over	1.5	million	on	Facebook.				The	massive	user	base	of	Facebook,	whose	platform	allowed	users	to	easily	search	and	subscribe	to	politicians’	accounts,	renders	the	platform	an	attractive	medium	for	campaigns	to	broadcast	 their	 message	 to	 a	 wide	 audience.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 data	 collection,	 Facebook	
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(2016)	 had	 1.1	 billion	 daily	 active	 users,	 Instagram	 (2016)	 approximately	 300	million,	 and	Snapchat	around	120	million	(Snap	Inc.,	2017).	Twitter	did	not	report	daily	active	users	at	the	time	but	claimed	310	monthly	active	users	(Twitter,	2016).	Although	these	are	global	figures	and	not	limited	to	the	U.S.,	Facebook	clearly	holds	the	pole	position	in	regards	to	audience	size	(according	to	Campbell,	90%	of	American	eligible	voters).	Figure	1	below	depicts	the	number	of	posts	issued	on	Facebook	and	Instagram,	as	well	as	the	number	of	Snapchat	stories.1	
	 	Unsurprisingly,	 of	 the	 three	 platforms	 included	 in	 Figure	 1,	 campaigns	 posted	 the	 most	content	on	Facebook.	Figure	1	also	shows	that	campaigns’	propensity	to	use	newer	platforms	like	 Instagram	 and	 Snapchat	 varied.	 Lower	 polling	 underdog	 candidates,	 like	 Rubio	 and	
																																								 																				
1	The	number	of	Snapchat	stories,	not	individual	snaps,	are	reported.	Due	to	the	ephemerality	of	snap	messages,	some	
may	be	missing	from	the	collected	data.		
18	
	
Sanders,	showed	high	adoption	rates	for	Instagram	and	Snapchat.	However,	the	trend	is	not	consistent	as	evidenced	the	Cruz	campaign’s	low	adoption	rate.			
Functionality	While	network	structure	is	one	factor	influencing	Facebook	adoption,	the	second	part	of	the	typology	 –	 functionality	 –	 also	 helps	 explain	 why	 campaigns	 take	 to	 Facebook.	 Table	 2	outlines	the	differences	in	functionality	across	the	three	platforms:	
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The	first	aspect	of	functionality	is	hardware.	Facebook,	Twitter,	and	Instagram	are	accessible	from	 multiple	 types	 of	 hardware:	 desktop	 computers,	 tablets,	 smartphones,	 and	smartwatches.	Snapchat,	on	the	other	hand,	is	exclusively	mobile	and	cannot	be	accessed	from	any	 other	 type	 of	 device.	 This	 hardware-specific	 feature	 of	 Snapchat	 has	 two	 direct	implications	 for	content	creation	on	 the	platform.	First,	 in	order	 to	post	content	 featuring	a	political	 candidate,	 the	 person	 filming	 snaps	 from	 a	 smartphone	must	 be	 in	 close	 physical	proximity	 to	 the	 candidate.	 The	 digital	 directors	 stated	 that	 a	 candidate’s	 “body	 man,”	 or	personal	assistant	who	travels	with	the	candidate,	was	usually	responsible	 for	 the	Snapchat	account.	The	second	implication	of	Snapchat’s	mobile	exclusivity	 is	 that	content	needs	to	be	uploaded	directly	from	the	mobile	device,	and	therefore	little	editing	or	consultation	with	the	campaign	 occurs	 before	 publishing	 content	 to	 a	 story.	 On	 the	 other	 platforms,	 by	 contrast,	campaigns	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 upload	 edited	 content	 at	 scheduled,	 strategic	 time	 points.	Wilson	hints	at	how	Snapchat’s	digital	architecture	generates	a	type	of	content	different	than	on	other	platforms: 
 “The	unique	thing	about	Snapchat	 is	 it	has	 to	be	done	right	there.	You	can’t	upload	a	photo,	 you	 can’t	 edit	 a	 video;	 it	 has	 to	 be	 physically	 from	 that	 device.	 So,	 you	were	seeing	 stuff	 that	 was	 coming	 right	 from,	 you	 know,	 where	 Marco	 was	 at	 that	 exact	moment.	 It	wasn’t	 coming	back	 to	headquarters	and	getting	 filtered	or	edited	 in	any	way.”		Since	Facebook,	Twitter,	and	particularly	Instagram	provide	several	functions	to	edit	content	prior	to	publishing,	the	type	of	visual	content	on	these	platforms	is	generally	more	polished	and	 complex	 (i.e.,	 infographics	 or	 memes).	 Figure	 2	 below	 illustrates	 how	 Snapchat’s	hardware	restrictions	encourage	a	more	raw	type	of	footage,	versus	Instagram’s	more	artistic,	edited	shots.	Both	posts	were	published	on	February	26	and	cover	the	same	event.	The	left	is	
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a	screenshot	of	a	Snapchat	video	from	a	rally	while	the	right	depicts	the	campaign’s	Instagram	representation	of	the	event	through	a	still		image.		
	Clearly,	the	Instagram	photo	has	been	edited	(i.e.,	“filtered”)	for	artistic	effect.		Moreover,	the	picture	has	been	strategically	chosen	to	show	both	the	candidate	and	a	band	of	enthusiastic	supporters.	 On	 Snapchat,	 the	 audience	 is	 depicted	 in	 real	 time	 and	 appears	 much	 more	mundane.	 Interestingly,	 the	 two	 representations	 also	 differ	 in	 the	 number	 of	 reported	attendants	at	 the	 rally	 (2,500	on	Snapchat	versus	4,000	on	 Instagram).	This	difference	may	
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signal	that	the	ability	to	control	or	schedule	content	allows	campaigns	more	time	to	validate	or	correct	information.			Snapchat’s	 less	filtered	glimpses	into	the	campaign,	compared	to	the	other	platforms’	more	polished	visual	content,	is	thus	not	only	attributable	to	hardware	but	also	its	supported	
media,	outlined	 above	 in	 Table	 2.	 All	 four	 platforms	 supported	 text,	 images,	 and	 video,	 but	they	placed	different	 constraints	 on	 the	 length	 of	 these	media	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 campaign.	Concerning	 text,	 Facebook	 capped	 posts	 at	 63,206	 characters,	 Twitter	 its	 notorious	 140,	Instagram	limited	captions	to	2,200	characters,	and	Snapchat	only	allowed	31	characters	to	be	overlaid	to	an	image	or	video	“snap.”	Regarding	video,	Facebook	supported	content	up	to	45	minutes,	Twitter	and	Instagram	a	much	lesser	30	and	60	seconds	respectively,	and	Snapchat	only	 10	 seconds	 per	 snap.	 Uploaded	 images	 are	 supported	 on	 Facebook,	 Twitter,	 and	Instagram,	although	the	optimal	pixel	size	and	level	of	compression	varies	across	them.	This	means	that	if	a	campaign	wants	to	share	the	same	image	across	different	platforms,	creative	teams	may	be	enlisted	to	alter	the	image	to	meet	the	requirements	ingrained	in	the	platform’s	architecture.		The	 types	 of	multimedia	 the	 platform	 supports,	 and	 the	 limitations	 placed	 on	 them,	directly	 affects	 the	 content	 campaigns	 can	 communicate.	 Although	 Instagram	 and	 Twitter	supported	video,	their	limitations	on	length	do	not	allow	for	substantial	content	from	debates	or	 media	 appearances.	 Video	 content	 on	 Instagram	 was	 scant,	 with	 videos	 comprising	 a	proportionately	low	percentage	of	posts	compared	to	images.	The	percentage	of	video	content	on	 Instagram,	 by	 campaign	 and	 in	 descending	 order,	 was:	 Trump	 (15%),	 Rubio	 (10%),	Sanders	(4%),	Clinton	(3%)	and	Cruz	(0%).	Facebook	had	a	much	higher	percentage	of	video	content,	with	most	running	over	60	seconds. 	
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	Supported	media	also	refers	to	the	rules	governing	hyperlinking,	and	Figure	3	shows	that	 between	 23%-47%	 of	 campaign’s	 Facebook	 content	 comprised	 of	 links.	 By-and-large,	links	were	aimed	at	redirecting	users	to	the	campaign’s	website	or	to	a	media	article	about	the	candidate.	Although	limitations	in	the	data	do	not	support	a	strict	comparison,	similar	usage	of	links	can	also	be	expected	on	Twitter.	On	Instagram	and	Snapchat,	campaigns	could	include	web	addresses	to	their	posts	in	text,	but	they	were	not	actionable	(i.e.,	users	could	not	click	on	them	to	be	directed	off	the	platform).	One	exception	is	that	on	Instagram,	an	actionable	link	can	be	included	only	in	a	user’s	profile	description.	This	led	the	Clinton	and	Rubio	campaigns	to	encourage	users	to	“check	out	the	link	in	bio	for	more	info.”	The	purpose	of	driving	users	off	 the	 platform	 and	 onto	 the	 candidate’s	 site	 is	 to	 sign	 them	up	 for	 email	 lists.	 Oczkowski	described	emails	as	“the	lifeblood	of	fundraising”	since	“over	70%	of	all	money	raised	online	
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comes	 from	email	programs,”	and	 they’re	also	 “very	helpful	 in	 turning	people	out	 to	events	and	rallies.”		How	users	access	media	content	within	these	platforms,	though,	is	influenced	is	by	two	aspects	 of	 functionality:	 the	 broadcast	 feed	 and	 the	 graphical	 user	 interface.	Whereas	 the	former	 structures	 content,	 the	 latter	 governs	 how	 it	 is	 displayed.	 Facebook’s	 centralized	broadcast	 feed	 (i.e.,	 the	 “News	 Feed”)	 provides	 the	 user	 with	 a	 series	 of	 algorithmically	filtered	 content	 published	 by	 peers,	 subscribed	 pages,	 advertisers,	 and	 other	 sources	appearing	on	the	feed	as	a	result	of	algorithmic	contagion.	Twitter’s	centralized	feed	(“Home	timeline”)	presents	users	with	chronologically-ordered	posts	based	on	their	subscriptions.	On	mobile	devices,	users	also	can	opt-in	to	the	Highlights	feed,	which	presents	users	with	more	algorithmically	 filtered	content	based	on	relevance.	 Instagram	has	 two	broadcast	 feeds:	one	for	subscribed	connections	(and	advertisers),	and	the	“Explore”	feature	that	provides	content	suggestions	 to	 users.	 Snapchat’s	 digital	 architecture,	 by	 contrast,	 includes	 almost	 no	algorithmic	 filtering;	 the	 platform	 sorts	 content	 chronologically	 according	 to	 when	 a	connection	 posted	 a	 message.	 Snapchat	 does,	 however,	 have	 a	 mass	 broadcast	 feed	 in	 the	form	of	“Live	Stories”:	series	of	user-generated	content	that	are	curated	by	the	platform	and	typically	focused	around	an	event	or	geographical	location.		So	 far,	 the	 functionality	 of	 the	 platforms	 has	 been	 compared	 according	 to	 how	elements	 of	 their	 digital	 architecture	 influence	 content	 production	 and	 diffusion	 within	 a	platform.	The	 last	 component	of	 functionality	 relates	 to	cross-platform	 integration:	whether	users	can	share	the	same	content	across	different	platforms	simultaneously.	Neither	Facebook	nor	Twitter	allows	posting	to	different	platforms,	but	 Instagram	allows	users	to	share	posts	across	Facebook	and	Twitter	simultaneously.	On	Snapchat,	users	can	only	save	content	taken	in	the	app’s	camera	and	repurpose	it	to	other	platforms.	Since	the	same	content	can	be	shared	
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across	Facebook,	Twitter,	and	Instagram,	and	content	taken	via	Snapchat	can	be	uploaded	to	these	platforms	as	well,	 it	cannot	be	assumed	that	political	campaign’s	content	 is	specific	 to	any	 one	 particular	 platform.	 For	 example,	 both	 the	 Trump	 and	 Rubio	 campaign	 uploaded	Snapchat	 videos	 (1	 and	 2,	 respectively)	 onto	 their	 Instagram	 accounts.	 Hillary	 Clinton	uploaded	a	picture	of	one	of	her	tweets	to	Instagram.	The	high	percentage	(26%)	of	text	only	statuses	making	 up	 Donald	 Trump’s	 Facebook	 content,	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 3,	 were	 largely	comprised	of	the	same	messages	he	posted	on	Twitter.		Thus,	although	a	platform’s	architecture	might	encourage	or	necessitate	a	certain	type	of	content,	scholars	should	not	assume	that	political	content	issued	on	a	social	media	platform	is	 necessarily	 specific	 to	 it.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 point	 empirically,	 Figure	 4	 presents	 the	percentage	 of	 Instagram	 content	 that	 was	 also	 present	 on	 Facebook.	 The	 “Direct	 Overlap”	category	 represents	when	 the	 visual	 content	and	 caption	were	 the	 exact	 same	 across	 both	platforms.	 “Edited	Overlap”	refers	 to	when	 the	visual	content	was	 the	same	but	 the	caption	was	 changed	 (for	 example,	 to	 incorporate	 a	 hashtag,	 change	 a	 hyperlink,	 or	 slightly	modify	phrasing).	“Instagram	Only”	is	the	percentage	of	content	that	was	not	posted	to	Facebook.		
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	Figure	4	reveals	that	for	three	out	of	the	five	politicians	(Trump,	Cruz,	and	Clinton),	over	half	of	 the	 content	posted	 to	 their	 Instagram	profiles	was	also	made	available	on	Facebook.	For	Rubio	 and	 Sanders,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 content	 posted	 on	 Instagram	 was	 typically	 not	uploaded	 to	 Facebook.	 	 These	 two	 underdog	 campaigns	 were	 also	 the	 most	 active	 on	Snapchat,	suggesting	that	new	platforms	may	be	more	attractive	to	low-polling	campaigns.			
Algorithmic	Filtering			 The	 remaining	 two	 categories	 of	 the	 digital	 architectures	 typology	 -	 algorithmic	
filtering	and	datafication	–	are	difficult	 to	assess	with	public	social	media	data,	but	 they	are	presented	 briefly	 here	 to	 round	 off	 the	 comparative	 platform	 analysis.	 Table	 3	 presents	 an	overview	of	the	similarities	and	differences	across	platforms.			
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	 Algorithmic	Filtering	
	 Reach	 Override	
Facebook	 Heavily	filtered	(relevance)	
Pay	to	promote	
User-diffusion	(Sharing)	
Twitter	 Moderately	filtered	(chronology)	
Pay	to	promote	
Index	via	hashtags	
User-diffusion	(Retweeting)	
Instagram	 Moderately	filtered	(chronology)	
Pay	to	Promote	
Index	via	hashtags		
Snapchat	 None		 No	algorithm	to	override	
	
Table	3:	Algorthmic	Filtering		As	alluded	to	previously,	Facebook’s	broadcast	feed	exhibits	heavy	algorithmic	filtering	based	on	 calculated	 relevance,	while	 Instagram	and	Twitters’	 algorithms	place	more	 emphasis	 on	the	chronological	order	of	posts.	 Snapchat	has	 little	 to	no	 filtering,	 granting	 the	user	a	high	level	of	autonomy	in	selecting	content.		Algorithmic	filtering	directly	influences	the	organic	(i.e.	non-paid)	reach	of	a	post.	Facebook	page	posts,	for	example,	typically	reach	less	than	10%	of	subscribers	organically,	a	number	 that	 continues	 to	decline	over	 time	 (Manson,	2014).	The	algorithms	of	Twitter	and	Instagram,	 favoring	 chronology	 over	 relevance,	 grant	 campaigns	 a	 more	 direct	 line	 to	subscribers.	However,	filtering	by	chronology	also	makes	the	reach	of	the	post	sensitive	to	the	overall	activity	on	the	platform.	During	times	of	heightened	political	activity	(e.g.	around	an	election	 or	 debate),	 posts	 can	 be	 easily	 “drowned	out”	 by	 higher	 levels	 of	 posting	 by	 other	users.	 Snapchat’s	 virtually	 non-existent	 filtering	 allows	 users	 the	 most	 direct	 access	 to	campaign	content,	with	the	important	caveat	that	these	broadcasts	disappear	after	24	hours.		To	counter	these	limitations	and	extend	reach,	each	platform	offers	mechanisms	to	 override	 algorithmic	 filtering.	 Facebook,	 Instagram,	 and	 Twitter	 offer	 pay-to-promote	
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services	to	extend	the	reach	of	an	existing	post	such	“boosting”	to	a	wider	audience	based	on	demographics	or	 interests.	Apart	 from	 this	market-driven	 feature,	 campaigns	 can	enlist	 the	help	of	supporters	 to	diffuse	messages	across	 their	own	networks	on	Facebook	and	Twitter	(via	 sharing	and	retweeting).	On	Twitter	and	 Instagram,	hashtags	are	an	effective	means	 to	index	 posts	 outside	 of	 one’s	 immediate	 follower	 network	 (Facebook	 has	 also	 incorporated	hashtag	 functionality,	 although	 it	 remains	 largely	 ineffective	 for	 increasing	 reach	 due	 to	Facebook’s	less	open	network	structure).	Although	Snapchat	lacks	a	curating	algorithm	to	be	overridden,	 being	 featured	 in	 a	 Snapchat	 “Live	 Story”	 can	 drastically	 increase	 the	 reach	 of	their	content.	Wilson	mentioned	that	Snapchat	worked	with	campaigns	to	promote	candidacy	announcements,	debate	days,	and	election	days.	When	the	Rubio	campaign	was	 feature	 in	a	Live	Story,	which	were	broadcast	either	nationally	or	in	a	specific	state,	view	counts	would	go	from	the	average	“few	thousand	per	day”	to	“definitely	get[ing]	up	into	the	higher	five	figures	of	views.”	Whereas	campaigns	can	utilize	override	mechanisms	to	extend	the	reach	of	a	post,	they	generally	rely	on	datafication	techniques	to	control	the	audiences	of	specific	posts.			
	
Datafication	Datafication,	 in	 a	 campaign	 context,	 implies	 the	 process	 of	 quantifying	 users’	 activity	 for	strategic	 purposes.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 data	 is	 utilized	 for	 matching	 and	 targeting	 specific	audiences	with	the	intent	of	persuasion	or	mobilization.	On	the	other,	datafication	allows	for	campaigns	to	monitor	and	collect	analytics	that	help	inform	future	strategy.	Datafication	is	a	complex,	 expensive,	 and	 iterative	 process	 in	 contemporary	 digital	 campaigning.	 Oczkowski	describes	 the	 process	 as,	 firstly,	 using	 a	 combination	 of	 data	 from	 voter	 files,	 commercial	warehouses,	 and	polling	 from	a	 small	 part	 of	 the	 electorate	 (around	1,500	people)	 to	 then,	secondly,	 extrapolating	 this	 data	 to	 build	 look-alike	 audiences	 of	 larger	 portions	 of	 the	electorate.	 Targeted	 messages	 are	 then	 issued	 to	 persuade	 voters,	 and	 analytics	 (often	
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monitored	 in	 real	 time)	 help	measure	 their	 effectiveness.	 Oczkowski	 describes	 the	 process	while	hinting	at	the	iterative	character	of	datification:		“So,	 I	say,	 these	are	Trump	supporters,	 these	are	people	who	 love	to	reduce	taxes,	 these	are	gun	supporters,	these	are	the	religious	rights	–	all	based	on	survey	data	and	database	data	that	I	have	and	that	I’ve	brought	in.	From	there,	we’re	then	segmenting	audiences	for	the	 purposes	 of	 our	 media	 teams	 to	 buy	 digital	 ads	 or	 to	 buy	 television,	 but	 also	 for	creative	 teams	 to	be	able	 to	 craft	messages:	 the	 ads,	 the	 types	of	 things	we’re	 saying	 to	people.	Those	two	things	then	come	together,	we	spend	money	to	do	paid	media,	and	then	we	go	back	in	the	field	and	we’re	consistently	polling	to	see	if	what	we’re	doing	is	working	and	how	effective	it	is.”		The	 above	 quote	 highlights	 how	 datafication	 has	 both	 offline	 (traditional	 polling	 and	television)	and	online	(digital	databases	and	ads)	dimensions.	Regarding	the	present	study’s	focus,	 the	 digital	 architectures	 of	 each	 platform	 offer	 varying	 types	 and	 degrees	 of	datafication,	which	are	summarized	below	in	Table	4.			
	 Datafication	
	 Matching	 Targeting	 Analytics	
Facebook	
Highly	developed	
”Custom”	and	
”Lookalike”	
Audiences	
Extremely	
sophisticated	
Several	Ad	formats	
Complex,	Real	
time	analytics	
(Walled-Garden)	
Twitter	
Moderately	
developed	
”Tailored	
Audiences”	
Moderately	
sophisticated	
Few	ad	formats	
Tagging	journalists	
Open	API	
Dashboards	
Instagram	 Same	as	Facebook	 Same	as	Facebook	 Same	as	Facebook	
Snapchat	
Least	developed	
”Snap	Audience	
Match”	(opt-out)	
Least	
sophisticated		
Ads	in	Stories	(opt-
out)	
Rudimentary	in	
primary,	improved	
in	general	election		
Table	4:	Datafication		
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Matching,	or	the	process	of	linking	data	to	online	social	media	profiles,	differs	across	platforms.	 Campbell	 describes	 the	 high	 sophistication	 of	 Facebook’s	 matching	 service,	“Custom	Audiences,”	as	being	able	to	match	70-80%	of	users	in	a	database	within	30	minutes	based	 solely	 on	 their	 names	 and	home	mailing	 addresses.	Once	 a	 custom	 audience	 is	 built,	Facebook	can	recommend	other	users	who	are	outside	of	the	custom	audience,	but	calculated	to	share	similar	datapoints,	 through	 the	 “Lookalike	Audience”	 feature.	Matched	or	 lookalike	audiences	 can	 then	 be	 targeted	 via	 a	 plethora	 of	 ad	 formats	 customizable	 by:	 multimedia,	placement	on	the	GUI,	and	hardware	(mobile	versus	desktop).	Owned	by	Facebook,	Instagram	offers	 the	 same	 suite	 of	 tools.	 Twitter	 has	 a	 similar	 matching	 and	 lookalike	 service	 called	“Tailored	 Audiences.”	 However	 in	 comparison	 with	 Facebook,	 Twitter’s	 matching	 is	 less	sophisticated	 (e.g.,	 it	 does	 not	 support	 home	mailing	 addresses)	 and	 offers	 few	 ad	 formats	outside	of	promoted	tweets,	accounts,	and	trends.	According	to	Campbell,	 though,	Twitter	is	used	to	target	lists	of	known	journalists	so	that:	“the	people	who	are	writing	the	[mainstream	media]	 stories	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day	 are	 the	 ones	 seeing	 your	 ad,	 and	 you’re	 encouraging	earned	 media	 responses.”	 Snapchat,	 as	 the	 newest	 platform	 with	 the	 least	 developed	datafication	 features,	 only	 began	 offering	 audience	 matching	 (“Snap	 Audience	 Match”)	 in	September	 2016,	 one	 month	 before	 the	 general	 election.	 Targeted	 ads	 on	 Snapchat	 are	inserted	between	stories,	and	the	platform	offers	users	the	option	to	opt-out	of	matching	and	targeting	in	their	privacy	settings.	Both	 matching	 and	 targeting	 are	 resource-intensive	 processes	 involving	 extensive	knowledge	 and	 monetary	 capabilities.	 As	 highlighted	 by	 Kreiss	 &	 McGregor	 (2017),	technology	firms	offer	consulting	services	to	high-profile	campaigns	to	assist	them	in	crafting	their	targeting	strategy.	Campbell	highlights	the	importance	of	these	services	when	he	states:	
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“We	value	 those	 relationships	 and	 there	 are	 some	very,	 very	 smart	people	working	 at	these	companies	that	are	helping	us	to	execute	the	strategy	that	we’re	coming	up	with,	and	 in	 some	cases	 even	help	us	 form	 the	 strategy	 that	we’re	 coming	up	with,	because	they	understand	their	platforms	better	than	anyone	does…almost	daily,	we’re	speaking	to	our	teams	[at	Google,	Facebook,	and	Twitter]	that	actually	help	to	facilitate	all	of	the	advertising”.			While	tech	companies	have	partisan	teams	that	assist	campaigns	in	their	targeting	strategies,	this	relationship	is	ultimately	symbiotic:	companies	raise	revenue,	campaigns	raise	electoral	support.	For	campaign	consultants,	analytics	become	crucial	for	assessing	the	effectiveness	of	a	communication	strategy	and	necessary	for	acquiring	more	resources	for	digital	advertising.	As	 Wilson	 remarks,	 “It’s	 hard	 to	 make	 the	 case	 for	 resources	 when	 you	 don’t	 have	 the	analytics	 to	 back	 it	 up.”	 Analytics	 help	 measure	 return	 on	 investment	 (ROI),	 but	 the	availability	of	analytics	differs	across	platforms.		Facebook	has	increasingly	taken	steps	to	limit	access	to	both	Facebook	and	Instagram	data;	the	platform’s	“walled-garden”	approach	requires	payment	(via	advertising)	in	exchange	for	data.	According	to	the	 interviewees,	Snapchat	as	a	start-up	was	 largely	unable	to	 inform	campaigns	about	their	view	rates,	and	the	purpose	of	advertising	on	the	platform	was	simply	to	better	get	a	sense	of	engagement.	Twitter,	according	to	Oczkowski,	“is	really	the	only	open	Firehouse	left,”	and	Wilson	mentioned	using	Twitter	to	monitor	mentions	of	certain	initiatives	the	 Rubio	 campaign	 was	 running,	 such	 as	 a	 “Vote	 Early	 Day”	 initiative	 aimed	 to	 increase	turnout.	 Dashboard	 applications	 like	 TweetDeck	 or	 Hootsuite	 can	 campaigns	 help	monitor	and	measure	 specific	 initiatives.	 However,	 Oczkowski	 also	 stated	 the	 limitations	 of	 Twitter	data:	“Twitter	data’s	great	but	it	doesn’t	represent	most	voters	in	America;	it’s	a	minority	of	very	 vocal	 people.”	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 and	 reach	 a	 larger	 portion	 of	 the	 electorate,	campaigns	 must	 invest	 significant	 resources	 into	 both	 online	 and	 offline	 data	 acquisition.	Moreover,	it	must	be	stated	that	from	a	data	collection	and	targeting	standpoint,	social	media	
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platforms	 comprise	 only	 a	 part	 –	 but	 an	 increasingly	 important	 part	 –	 of	 the	modern	 day	campaign	apparatus.			
Discussion	and	Conclusion		Although	 the	 social	 media	 landscape	 remains	 dominated	 by	 early	 market	 entrants	 like	Facebook	 and	Twitter,	 scholars	need	new	approaches	 to	meet	 –	 but	 also	 anticipate	 –	 rapid	changes	in	this	ever-evolving	digital	space.	The	present	study	has	put	forth	the	argument	that	scholarly	 attention	 to	 a	 platform’s	 digital	 architecture	 provides	 a	 valuable	 and	 flexible	heuristic	to	approach	cross-platform	research	of	social	media.	Ultimately,	the	study’s	aim	has	been	 to	 illuminate	 new	 pathways	 for	 comparative	 social	 media	 research	 in	 the	 context	 of	political	 campaigning,	 but	 the	 framework	 can	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 studies	 of	 citizens’	discussions	or	journalistic	reporting.		Theoretically,	 the	 study	 posits	 that	 four	 aspects	 of	 a	 platform’s	 digital	 architecture	influence	 political	 communication	 on	 social	 media	 –	 network	 structure,	 functionality,	algorithmic	 filtering,	 and	 datafication.	 Respectively,	 these	 four	 infrastructural	 elements	 of	platform	design	impact	the	decisions	that	political	campaigns	make	in	terms	of:	the	audiences	they	 try	 to	 reach,	 the	 form	and	content	of	messages	 they	produce,	 the	diffusion	patterns	of	these	messages,	 and	how	 financial	 resources	are	allocated	 for	digital	 campaigning	on	 social	media.			The	 study’s	 exploratory	 operationalization	 of	 the	 digital	 architectures	 framework,	applied	 to	 the	 case	 of	 the	 2016	 U.S.	 elections,	 yields	 three	 interesting	 results.	 First	 and	foremost,	 campaigns	shared	much	of	 the	same	content	–	 in	 text,	 images,	and	video	–	across	different	 social	 media	 platforms.	 Basing	 their	 study	 on	 interviews	 with	 U.S.	 campaigners,	Kreiss	et	al.	(2017,	p.	2)	argue	that	“campaigns	must	produce	their	own	creative	content	for	
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very	 different	 platforms	 like	 Facebook,	 Instagram,	 Twitter,	 and	 Snapchat.”	 While	 certainly	true	 to	 an	 extent,	 this	 study	 –	 even	 with	 its	 limitations	 -	 finds	 an	 overlap	 in	 campaign	messages	across	all	of	the	platforms	studied.	Although	one	platform	may	encourage	(or	even	necessitate)	a	certain	type	of	content,	other	platforms	with	similar	functionalities	can	support	the	 re-appropriation	 of	 content	 across	 multiple	 channels.	 Scholars	 should	 therefore	 exert	caution	 in	 assuming	 that	 the	 content	 posted	 to	 a	 particular	 social	 media	 is	 unique	 to	 the	platform.	 Cross-platform	 analysis,	with	 rigorous	 attention	 to	 platforms’	 digital	 architecture,	can	help	ascertain	whether	and	why	content	is	specific	to	a	given	platform.		Second,	both	the	interviews	and	social	media	data	point	to	the	dominance	of	Facebook	in	 the	 2016	 election	 cycle.	 The	 platform	was	 the	most	 attractive	 social	 media	 for	 political	campaigns	 on	 account	 of	 several	 architectural	 design	 features.	 Facebook’s	 public	 pages,	providing	an	open	network	structure	with	easily	searchable	accounts,	supported	large	social	media	 followerships	 (demonstrated	 here,	 for	 example,	 by	 differences	 in	 video	 view	 rates	across	 platforms).	 The	 functionality	 of	 hyperlinking,	 meanwhile,	 was	 heavily	 utilized	 by	campaigns	to	drive	traffic	to	their	websites	(for	fundraising)	and	collect	emails	(for	audience	matching).	Non-restrictive	rules	regarding	video	lengths	rendered	the	platform	a	key	medium	for	long-form	visual	telecommunication.	Algorithmic	filtering,	and	the	ability	to	override	it	via	paid	advertising,	allowed	campaigns	to	reach	potential	voters	outside	of	their	organic	follower	bases.	Moreover,	 Facebook’s	 sophisticated	matching,	 targeting,	 and	 analytics	 suites	 enabled	high-resource	campaigns	to	split-test	messages	to	voters	in	strategic	geographical	locations.		Third,	even	though	campaigns	invested	less	heavily	in	newer	platforms	like	Instagram	and	Snapchat,	the	study	finds	that	all	candidates	analyzed	were	active	on	these	platforms.	A	standard	trend	observable	across	the	campaigns	is	that	Instagram	was	used	more	often	of	the	two.	This	is	likely	due	to	the	functionality	differences	between	the	two	platforms:	Instagram	
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allows	campaigns	to	control	the	image	of	their	candidate	via	uploading	polished	content	at	a	scheduled	time.	Snapchat,	while	carving	its	niche	in	the	social	media	marketplace	through	it’s	live	 and	 disappearing	 broadcast	 features,	 was	 likely	 more	 risky	 (and	 less	 useful)	 for	campaigns	to	adopt	than	Instagram.	Crucially,	Snapchat	lacked	a	comprehensive	datafication	incentive	 to	 reward	politicians’	who	 invested	 in	 the	platform.	Future	work	 can	dive	deeper	into	 investigating	 the	 content	 (and	 timing)	 of	 messages	 on	 these	 and	 other	 emerging	platforms,	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	whether	 they	 reveal	patterns	of	 communication	 that	help	elucidate	a	campaign’s	wider	strategy.				The	 empirical	 analysis	 is,	 certainly,	 limited	 by	 several	 factors.	 Twitter	 data	was	 not	attainable,	 and	 the	 data	 from	 other	 platforms	 is	 solely	 that	which	was	 publically	 available.	Targeted	 advertisements	 are	 often	 unpublished,	 rendering	 their	 collection	 via	 traditional	computational	means	difficult.	Such	private	posts	 likely	differ	 in	content	 to	public	ones,	and	their	inclusion	in	the	study	would	likely	affect	the	descriptive	results	reported	here.		In	 concluding	 the	 study,	 an	 important	 note	 must	 be	 made	 regarding	 the	 digital	architectures	framework:	digital	architectures	are	subject	to	rapid	and	transformative	change.	Even	 though	 Snapchat’s	 architecture,	 for	 example,	 offered	 only	 rudimentary	 analytics	 to	campaigns	during	the	primaries,	the	platform	was	updated	by	the	general	election	to	provide	campaigns	with	a	sophisticated	means	of	acquiring	users’	emails.	The	Trump	campaign,	says	Oczkowski,	 gathered	 “hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 emails	 off	 the	 Snapchat	 platform”	 by	presenting	users	with	advertisements	encouraging	them	to	“swipe	up”	and	enter	their	email	addresses.	Even	in	the	interim	between	the	2016	primaries	and	the	writing	of	this	article,	all	of	 the	 platforms	 included	 here	 have	 undergone	 significant	 transformations	 in	 their	 digital	architectures.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 comparison’s	 purpose	 has	 been	 to	 elucidate	 how	 the	architectures	of	a	platform	can	be	compared,	systematically,	at	a	particular	point	in	time.		
35	
	
Future	scholars	may	wish	to	engage	with	the	question	of	how	changes	in	a	platform’s	digital	architecture	over	time	influence	campaigning	practices	 longitudinally,	as	well	as	how	the	 architectures	 of	 platforms	 not	 analyzed	 here	 (e.g.,	 YouTube	 or	 WhatsApp)	 affect	campaigns’	digital	communication	strategies.	Moreover,	data	from	other	sources	such	as	voter	turnout,	donation,	or	polling	 figures	should	be	 incorporated	 into	 future	research	designs,	 in	order	to	corroborate	how	digital	communication	 is	 impacted	by	offline	dynamics	critical	 for	campaigns	and	their	strategies.			 References	
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